Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation And State Capacity
December 5, 2020
On the other hand, the turnover of the marginalized (i.e. when a new government coalition comes to power) hinders the progress of a peace agreement because foreign leaders play the role of “shadow veto players” (Ryckman and Braithwaite, 2017). Kauffman argues that the leaders of the marginalized do not have enough information about the peace process, which prevents them from deciding when to end the war (Cited by Ryckman and Braithwaite, 2017). Mansfield and Snider (1995) claim that some political leaders, motivated by personal gain, come to power with a war agenda. In addition, they fear losing the next election if their national and international hawkish supporters withdraw their support for the government. On the other hand, Wise adds (2018) that peace agreements sometimes exclude and marginalize non-dominant ethnic groups, leading to exclusion amid the inclusion dilemma (EAI), leading to an integrated error in the territory`s self-management system. Jana, Werner and Piia (2018) have extended the inclusion exclusion grant from a gender point of view. Their research shows that between 1990 and 2014, women signed only 13 out of 130 cases (Jana, Werner and Piia, 2018). Several scientists, including Thania Paffenholz (2014) and McGregor (2006), argue that the sustainability of peace agreements depends on broader support from civil society, consisting of voluntary organizations and groups such as religious institutions, women`s organizations and human rights groups (Krznaric, 1999).
Orjuela, 2003). Nilsson (2012) notes that civil society participation will reduce the risk of agreements failure by 64%. Aghedo, Iro, “Winning the war, losing the peace: Amnesty and the challenges of post-conflict peace-building in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. Non-signatory groups may also use violence to reinforce mistrust between signatories and implementation. For example, Kydd and Walter (2002) claim that negotiations on the Oslo Accords between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took place in conditions of mutual distrust. Neither party was certain that the other party would meet its commitments. But the Hamas group, which did not sign, contributed greatly to the failure of the Oslo Accords by carrying out violence that exacerbated mistrust between the signatories. According to Kydd and Walter (2002), Hamas succeeded in derailing the Oslo peace process because of mutual mistrust between the Israeli government and the PLO. This derailment was a calculated act. Hamas did not participate in the negotiations of the agreement and the success of the agreement would have undermined Hamas` objectives, so Hamas used violence to undermine its implementation.